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Abstract:
There is widespread disagreement about how to understand musical improvisation in
the current literature. My paper is motivated by the desire to settle this disagreement.
I do this, in part, by emphasizing the important role action descriptions play in
classifying specific actions as specific action-types, like improvised or intentional. In
order to further settle the disagreement over the nature of musical improvisation, I
defend a general account of improvisation, which can also aid in understanding a
wide variety of specific types of improvisation. According to my general account, an
improvised action is any unplanned and novel action performed by an agent within a
predetermined improvisational framework. This definition helps make sense of the
disagreement over the nature of musical improvisation, provides clarity for empirical
project studying the neural correlates of improvised action and more generally helps
us separate improvised action from other types of action, like planned or deliberate
action, and also random action.
Introduction
There is limited discussion of improvisation in contemporary analytic philosophy.
Though improvisation seems to be a type of action, few philosophers of action have
written on the subject. Most of what has been written on the subject has come from
aestheticians, and focuses primarily on musical improvisation. A large bulk of the
serious philosophical work on improvisation appears in two issues of the Journal of
Aesthetics and Art Criticism. A special issue of that journal was dedicated to
improvisation in 2000, and more recently, in 2010, the journal hosted a symposium
on the subject. In addition to aesthetics, some cognitive neuroscientists studying
creativity and improvisation in jazz music and hip-hop have waded into philosophical
territory in their discussions of their empirical findings (see Limb & Braun 2008,
Ellamil et al. 2012, Liu et al. 2012). In all of this literature very little is said about
improvisation in general as a type of action. In the absence of a general account of
improvised action there is little consensus about how we should understand musical
improvisation and other specific types of improvised action. Likewise, it’s not clear
how to best understand the results of experiments that seek to understand the neural
correlates of improvised action. The general account of improvised action offered in
this paper hopes to help settle some of confusion surrounding these issues.
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The paper will begin by looking at one of the disagreements folks are having
about a particular kind of improvised action, namely, the ongoing debate about how
to understand musical improvisation. Most of the authors working on musical
improvisation are quick to point out a distinction between ‘improvisation’ in the
product sense, used to discuss the musical piece that is created, and ‘improvisation’
in the action sense, used to discuss the action that creates the musical piece (see
Alperson, 1984). So, for example we can talk about Miles Davis’s improvisation in
terms of his action, or Miles Davis’s improvisation in terms of his song. The sense I
am most interested in is the action sense. I will confine my talk to this sense of the
word, except where otherwise noted. As Philip Alperson, one of the leading scholars
working on improvisation, points out, there is sure to be some close connection
between improvised actions and the products such actions produce (1984). With that
being said, I do not intend to explore this connection in very much depth at this time.
Alperson describes the action sense of musical improvisation as “an activity
of spontaneous music-making in which the improviser somehow practices
simultaneously the interdependent functions of composition and performance”
(1984). Carol S. Gould and Kenneth Keaton oppose Alperson’s view of
improvisation, arguing, “improvisation is conceptually independent of spontaneity”
(2000). They maintain that a performance of a piece of classical music, composed
prior to performance, nevertheless still involves a degree of improvisation. Gould and
Keaton point out that no matter how much detail a composer puts into a musical
score, there will always be unspecified musical elements that the performer will have
to improvise during the course of every performance. Alperson acknowledges these
unplanned aspects of music playing, but says they amount to the interpretation of a
piece, rather than the improvisation of one.
Gould and Keaton’s project can be seen as an attempt to dissolve the
distinction between improvisation and interpretation as it’s commonly discussed in
the literature. By taking this position Gould and Keaton also confront the popular idea
that jazz and classical music can be distinguished in part by observing that playing
jazz is an improvised activity while playing classical music is an interpretive activity.
On Gould and Keaton’s view, improvisation is an essential feature of every musical
performance. On Alperson’s view improvisation refers only to the spontaneous
creation of new musical sequences, as in jazz.
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In neuroscience, there is slightly more agreement about how to understand
improvisation. However, the definition everyone agrees on is a bit obscure. Charles
Limb is one of the leading neuroscientists studying the neural correlates of
improvised action and creativity. In a study published in 2008, Limb put several jazz
musicians into an fMRI scanner and had them improvise on a magnetically safe MIDI
keyboard over a prerecorded track. In his discussion of his findings, Limb puts forth a
brief definition of the object of his study. He says his study is about the neural
correlates of ‘spontaneous musical performance’, which he defines as “immediate,
on-line improvisation of novel melodic, harmonic, and rhythmic musical elements
within a relevant musical context” (2008). The definition looks a bit like Alperson’s.
Instead of defining ‘improvisation’ in terms of ‘spontaneity’ though, he defines
‘spontaneity’ in terms of ‘improvisation’. This is frustrating because, at this point, it is
unclear how ‘spontaneous performance’ is supposed to tell us anything about
‘improvisation’ or vice versa. Simply equating ‘spontaneous performance’ with
‘improvisation’ does not seem to give us the information we need to understand the
meaning of the phrase. Although Limb does not seem to be giving a thoroughgoing
analysis of the concept of improvisation, such an analysis might lead to a better
explanation of the data collected by Limb and his colleagues. So it seems like a great
deal of a wide range of scholarly work on improvisation could benefit from having a
well-defined general account of improvised action.
In this paper, I will propose a general account of improvisation, one that can
help adjudicate disagreements about the nature of musical improvisation, as well as
provide clarity to empirical projects seeking to understand the neural correlates of
improvisation. I suggest a new definition of improvisation along the following lines –
an improvised action is any unplanned and novel action performed by an agent
within a properly defined improvisational framework. My hope is that in addition to
clarifying the confusions and disagreements I’ve just mentioned this definition will
also help distinguish improvisation in general from other kinds of action. The
suggestion here is that by knowing what improvised actions are, we should be able
to distinguish them from actions that are not improvised, like planned, deliberate,
random or reflexive actions. My account will hopefully set improvisation apart from
these other kinds of actions.
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One final idea I want to advocate in this paper is that although improvisation
is often discussed in terms of performance art, it is possible to think about
improvisation in a wider context, as an essential component of our day-to-day
activities. Thinking about improvisation in this way provides an even stronger
motivation for the present study. Consider the following examples of improvisation—
when we have a surprise encounter at the market with a friend, we improvise our
way through some small talk, not having time to plan out any of the things we end up
saying. When we realize the IKEA bed didn’t come with all of its screws, we
improvise solutions. When we obtain a new piece of complicated technology, we
may toss the user manual aside and improvise with it as we learn how to properly
use it. It might even be argued that we improvise our way through close
relationships, marriages and child rearing. There are more obvious examples
available to us, like dancing, being witty at a dinner party, running a seminar, playing
fast-paced sports like basketball, hockey or ping-pong, etc. These are all examples
of activities that I hope everyone agrees involve a great deal of improvisation.
My plan for the rest of the paper is as follows: before defending my general
account of improvisation I first want to discuss the disagreement between Alperson
and his critics in more depth. A discussion of how to adjudicate this disagreement will
follow. In short, on my analysis, the disagreement arises between Alperson and his
critics because they are not careful enough with how they describe the actions they
are trying to classify as improvised. They are prone to vague assertions like ‘jazz is
improvised and classical music isn’t’. On my view, there are aspects of both jazz and
classical music performances that count as improvised actions, and other aspects of
each that do not count as improvised actions. When we are careful about how we
describe the actions involved in playing classical or jazz music, determining which of
them are improvised and which are not becomes a relatively straightforward affair.
Following the discussion of Alperson and his critics will be a more in-depth
discussion of my positive account of improvised action. My account consists of four
parts that I will discuss in turn. First I will discuss why improvisations must be
unplanned. Second I will discuss why improvisations must be novel. Third I will
discuss why improvisations must be performed within a particular framework. Finally,
I will conclude by saying something about the role of agency in improvisation. Keep
in mind that even though most of my discussion focuses on musical improvisation, it
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is supposed to be an analysis of improvised action in general. Therefore, anything I
say about the structure of musical improvisation should also be applicable to the
variety of day-to-day improvised actions previously mentioned. When possible I will
use examples to make this point explicit. Now we proceed to the debate between
Alperson and his critics over the nature of musical improvisation.
Musical Improvisation
Alperson’s view of improvisation relies on an understanding of the difference
between composition and performance. Alperson defines composition as “that
creative act of conceiving of and organizing the parts or elements which make up the
pattern or design of the musical whole” (1984). He defines performance as “that
executory activity by means of which a musical composition is then rendered into a
sequence of sounds” (1984). According to Alperson, the “conventional” state of
affairs in music is a two-stage process, whereby a composer composes a piece of
music that at some later time is performed by some performer, who may or may not
be the same person as the composer. What is unique about improvised action is that
it involves collapsing these two processes into one activity. On Alperson’s view,
when a musician improvises she simultaneously becomes the composer and the
performer of a new piece of music.1
Alperson discusses the ontology of improvised performances in terms of the
type/token distinction. Following Joseph Margolis’s version of the type/token
distinction, Alperson describes a ‘type’ as an abstract particular that can be
instantiated. Tokens are instantiations of types. For example, a sculptor might create
a wooden statue. This statue would be a token of a type. Copies of the statue might
be cast in bronze and each one of these along with the original wooden piece would
be tokens of the abstract type. Alperson, following Margolis and Kant, adds to this
familiar framework the concept of a ‘megatype’. I take megatypes to be something
like a ‘fuzzy-type’, capable of acting as a type for a limited variety of slightly different
tokens2. So consider the megatype of “Johnny B. Goode”. Chuck Berry’s version,

1

This parallels Bill Evans’ famous comment that musical improvisation is the process of
‘composing one minute’s music in one minute’s time’.
2
Thanks to Brit Brogaard for pointing out that there may be some similarities here to
prototype theory, or Wittgenstein’s discussion of family resemblances. The different
performances of “Johnny B. Goode” I mentioned share enough similarities they can be said
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Jimi Hendrix’s version and the Rolling Stones’ version are all tokens of this
megatype, even though these versions sound very different from each other. So
Alperson wants to know, how do cases of improvised music function in terms of this
framework? Is an act of musical improvisation an instantiation of some already
existing megatype? Or could it be the generation of some new megatype?
Central to Alperson’s view is the claim that an improviser composes a new
song just as she or he performs it, so it cannot be that an improvised performance
instantiates an already existing megatype. Further, on Alperson’s view, an
improvised musical performance does not involve the creation of a new megatype
either. This is because megatypes are supposed to admit a number of instantiations,
and improvised songs do not do this. Alperson claims that it is highly unlikely that
improvised performances would be exactly replicated in all “the musically relevant
ways” (1984). Gould and Keaton point out the weakness of this part of Alperson’s
argument, as it seems to rest on probabilistic concerns, rather than on logical
necessity (2000). While this seems like a valid criticism, I want to table it and finish
presenting Alperson’s view.
Alperson notes that recordings are very often made of improvised
performances. One might be tempted to think that since these recordings can be
used as a reference point for reproductions of the work, a megatype really is being
created during an improvisation. In response to this Alperson writes, “However, such
cases [i.e. recordings] would stand to the originals as copies of paintings stand to
their originals, i.e., as tokens of a megatype, only if one thinks of improvisations as
musical structures or designs” (1984). Alperson thinks we should not think of
improvisations in terms of the musical structures or designs produced, i.e. in the
product sense. Instead we should think of improvisation in terms of the action
undertaken, i.e. in the action sense. On this view, it would be inappropriate to think of
a recording as a token instance of an improvisation. Instead, he writes, “what we

to be tied together to the extent to which they resemble a prototypical version of ‘Johnny B.
Goode”, or because they are all similar enough to obviously belong to the same ‘family’, i.e.
the family of songs rightly called “Johnny B. Goode”. In keeping with the literature I’m dealing
with, I plan to keep talking about megatypes, rather than prototypes or families. It seems as
though megatype could be exchanged with one of these other terms without much trouble.
Readers are invited to think about megatypes in terms of prototypes or families, if they so
chose.
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have is a record of a (unique) action” (1984). The megatype for an improvisation in
the action sense would have to an abstraction of the actions that count as the
performance, not an abstraction of the sounds produced by that performance. So if
you transcribed and learned to play the notes on a recording of an improvised
performance, your performance would not count as an instantiation of the original
improvisation. This is because your performance would be missing one of the
essential features of the original improvisation, namely that it was produced
spontaneously rather than being played off of a score. The only way to faithfully
reproduce an improvisation would be if some musician somehow happened to
spontaneously replay the same notes played by the original improviser. The
performance would have to be the same ‘in all the musically relevant way’–a highly
unlikely occurrence, given the sheer range of possibilities afforded to players of
improvised music.
Gould and Keaton have criticized Alperson’s view of improvisation, which
strongly contrasts improvisation with what he calls the ‘conventional’ state of affairs
in classical music. Gould and Keaton think performances of classical music do not
differ in the extreme way Alperson suggests. They do agree that there are important
difference between jazz and classical music, but they argue jazz and classical music
“differ more in degree than in kind” (2000). On their view, improvisation arises from
“a relation between the score and the performance event” (2000). They argue that,
just like a jazz musician, “a classical performer interpreting a work produces a unique
sound event and does so with an element of spontaneity”(2000). For example, they
write, “While melodies and harmonies may be specified in advance, the precise
realization of dynamics, rhythmic subtleties, timbre, intonation, and articulation arises
at the moment of the performance and will vary (often considerably) from
performance to performance, even when the piece is played by the same musician”
(pg. 145). Typically these subtle aspects of playing music are not included in the
composition. Deciding how to play these aspects is left up to the performer.
On Gould and Keaton’s view there is no real difference between what a jazz
musician does and what a classical musician does. They argue that the one should
be able to give the same analysis of the type/token distinction for classical music as
Alperson gives for jazz music. That is, it is highly unlikely that a musician could ever
faithfully reproduce a performance of a piece of classical music, due to all the subtle
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and improvised differences players add to the composition during their
performances. Gould and Keaton agree that the improvised solos of jazz allow for a
wider degree of improvised action, but they maintain that the wide degree of
improvisation available to a jazz musician does not make what she or he does
essentially different from what a classical musician does. Both involve improvising
certain aspects of the composition.
So what is the source of the disagreement between Gould and Keaton and
Alperson, and what should be done about it? As previously mentioned, I think that
the source of this disagreement is a result of the way the actions in question are
described. In both of these opposing views, one finds talk about ‘playing jazz’ and
‘playing classical music’. Talking about improvisation at this level of description is not
likely to allow us to say anything of real interest with respect to improvisation. These
descriptions are so general that they cannot be rightly be classified as essentially
improvised or not. We need to examine finer grained descriptions of actions if we are
to make such classifications. Lower level descriptions are more easily classified as
being or not being improvised, as we will see.
In what follows I will show how being careful about action descriptions when
classifying them as improvised or not can help settle the debate between Alperson
and his critics. After my attempt to settle the debate about the nature of musical
improvisation, I will defend the following general account of improvised action: an
improvised action is any unplanned and novel action performed by an agent within a
properly defined improvisational framework. I repeat this definition now because it
will be useful to keep it in mind while I work on the problem at hand.
Response to Alperson and his Critics
In order to press the importance of being careful about our descriptions when
attempting to classify specific actions as specific action types, I want to reference the
work of G.E.M. Anscombe, one of the founders of contemporary philosophy of
action. Donald Davidson called her 1957 book Intention, “the most important
treatment of action since Aristotle”. Some of what Anscombe says about intentional
actions can be roughly translated to apply to improvised actions as well. Anscombe
argues that actions are intentional on some levels of description but not on others
(1957). Similarly, I think actions are improvised on some levels of description but not
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on others. Before we apply this Anscombian idea to improvised actions, we should
first take note of how it gets set up for intentional actions.
Consider Anscombe’s famous example of a man pumping water into the
cistern of a house (1957). This person has plans to murder the people in the house
with a poison she has somehow planted in the water supply. Anscombe considers a
wide range of descriptions of this action. Some of the descriptions are of intentional
actions, and some of them are not. For example, the person in the example is
intentionally pumping her arm. She is intentionally refilling the house’s water supply.
She is also intentionally poisoning the inhabitants of the house. It would be wrong,
however, to say that she is intentionally contracting [such-and-such] muscles, even
though this is a description of the same action I just described at various other levels.
Contracting [such-and-such] muscles is not a description of an improvised action
because it does not satisfy Anscombe’s requirement that a person must be nonobservationally aware of what they are intentionally doing.
The basic claim here is if someone asks you ‘why you are pumping your
arm?’ and you look, startle, and exclaim ‘oh my, I hadn’t noticed that my arm was
pumping’, then pumping your arm is not a description of an intentional action. Or, if
you are nervously bouncing your leg during the final moments of a long seminar,
someone might become annoyed and ask you to stop. Not realizing you were doing
this until it was brought to your attention, you might say to the annoyed person, ‘I’m
sorry, but I wasn’t doing it intentionally.’
To help explain Anscombe’s requirement that we be non-observationally
aware of our intentional actions, consider one last example—we are nonobservationally aware of the position of our body parts. I do not have to look down to
see if my knee is bent. I do not become aware that my knee is bent based on some
tingling sensation being sent through my nervous system. I am aware that my knee
is bent non-observationally. The awareness we have of our intentional actions is
supposed to be similar. In standard cases, I do not need to observe my arm pumping
in order to be aware of what I am doing. On Anscombe’s view, being nonobservationally aware of the things I am intentionally doing is just part of what it
means to be doing something intentionally. That being said, we standardly do not
have non-observational knowledge of contracting [such-and-such] muscles when we
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are intentionally pumping our arms. If I had some sophisticated knowledge about
human anatomy, I might be able to look down at my pumping arm and determine that
[such-and-such] muscles were contracting. So it is possible for me to be aware of my
activity at this level of description, but only after a bit of observation, which
immediately exempts it from being classified as intentional. So how does all this
apply to musical improvisation and improvisation in general?
We can start to apply these Anscombian ideas to musical improvisation by
thinking about the different ways we describe the actions we take to be improvised.
Consider that both classical and jazz musicians usually plan to play [such-and-such]
song. In standard cases, this is usually not considered an improvised activity. Playing
[such-and-such] song is an action one usually plans in advance. Sometimes such a
plan is made explicit by a setlist, written by a bandleader and agreed upon by his
group. In the case of the classical musician, part of her plan to play [such-and-such]
song involves plans to play [such-and-such] notes. Remember that on my account,
actions that are planned in advance do no count as improvised actions. So playing
[such-and-such] notes does not count as a description of an improvised activity for
the classical musician, because, in standard cases, the classical musician has
planned to play those notes in advance.
With that being said, the same classical musician might not have included
playing with [such-and-such] dynamics and rhythm in her plans to play [such-andsuch] song. So for a classical musician playing with [such-and-such] dynamics and
rhythm may indeed count as a description of an improvised action. So on my
account, Gould and Keaton appear to be somewhat vindicated. Musical performance
does seem to essentially involve some set of improvised actions, at least under
certain descriptions. What is missing from their account is a process for indentifying
these actions. I have argued that this can be done by carefully attending to our
action descriptions. Once we are clear about the specific action we have in mind, we
can determine whether is falls inside or outside of my proposed definition. Actions
like playing jazz music or playing classical music aren’t easily categorized as fully
improvised or fully non-improvised.
As for the jazz musician, he may only have a plan to play such-and-such
song, without any plans to play [such-and-such] notes with [such-and-such]
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dynamics and rhythm3. So, since the jazz musician does not plan out what notes he
will play or how he will play them, we can say that he improvises these actions. The
main difference between playing classical music and playing jazz music then is that
playing jazz music involves the improvisation of a wider range of actions, again
vindicating Gould and Keaton’s position that jazz and classical performances differ in
degree rather than kind. The jazz musician can improvise melodies, rhythms and
dynamics, while the classical musician is standardly restricted by the conventions of
classical music from improvising new melodies. The classical musician is, however,
allowed to improvise rhythms, dynamics and other subtle aspects of her
performance.
Are Improvised Actions Intentional?
You may be wondering how closely the action description playing [such-and-such]
notes parallels the action description contracting [such-and-such] muscles. The
debate over this question amounts to the debate over whether improvising is an
intentional action. That is, if playing notes is like contracting muscles, then playing
notes is an unintentional action, in addition to being an improvised one. I tentatively
suggest that the act of improvising seems like something someone does
intentionally, as in the case where I know I am to take a solo after the second
chorus4. In such a case, when the end of the second chorus comes, I have a plan to
start improvising, and I proceed to improvise intentionally until the end of the section.
From this we can observe something odd about my view: in cases when one plans to
improvise in advance, improvising is not a description of an improvised action.
Rather the improvised actions are the unplanned for subroutines that execute the
plan to improvise, i.e. playing [such-and-such] notes, etc.
In contrast to the intentional act of improvising, lower level descriptions of
action like playing [such-and-such] notes, may not count as a description of an

3

For the sake of argument, I am thinking here of a jazz piece that is totally improvised start to
finish. Recently Keith Jarrett is perhaps most famous for performing this kind of totally
improvised jazz. Jarrett is well known for his completely improvised concerts, which he
performs often by himself, and sometimes with a trio – the later is an excellent display of what
Bill Evans calls ‘collective coherent thinking’.
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intentional action. This is because, like contracting [such-and-such] muscles, one
may not have non-observational knowledge of what one is doing while one is playing
[such-and-such] notes. In standard cases of improvising, the performer may know he
is improvising, but does not necessarily know what notes he is playing. Many of the
jazz musicians I have personally spoke with describe improvisation as something
that happens in an altered state of mind. They report that when they improvise they
feel like they are daydreaming, mediating, or under some kind of hypnosis. They
report that the notes they play just come to them. In fact, when they try to attend too
closely to the notes they are playing, they begin to make mistakes and fall out of
rhythm. So on a first pass, certain actions, like playing [such-and-such] notes, are
likely to be unintentional, in addition to being unplanned and improvised.
A General Account of Improvisation
As previously mentioned, on my account, actions need to be more than just
unplanned if they are to count as improvised. They also need to be novel and
performed within an improvisational framework. Since there are more opportunities
to improvise in jazz performance, as we have just shown, we can say that the
improvisational framework is wider in jazz than it is in classical performances, and
thus playing jazz involves a higher degree of improvisation. A classical musician is
afforded less freedom to improvise when compared to the freedom afforded to a jazz
musician, and thus playing classical music involves a lower degree of improvisation.
When freedom diminishes, so does the degree of improvisation. When our freedom
becomes too abundant though, it might no longer make sense to say we are
improvising either.
Additionally, according to my definition, the improvised parts of both classical
and jazz performances must be novel actions. I include this constraint because an
action that is unplanned but is a matter of routine should not count as improvised.
For example, bringing my bow up to my instrument, is probably not part of any
musicians plan to play [such-and-such] song. However, it is something that almost
always happens when one executes a plan to play [such-and-such] song. It follows
from this that bringing my bow up to my instrument is a description of a routine
action, and thus it should not count as improvised. Now that we have all the
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elements of my account out in the open, it is time to say a bit more about each,
starting with the unplanned nature of improvised actions.
When we make plans to do something in the future, they are usually plans to
perform an action under a certain description. For example, I have a plan to ride the
Metrolink tomorrow. My plan to ride the Metrolink tomorrow includes the planning of
some subroutines, like packing my bag, making sure I have my wallet and Metrolink
pass, driving my car to the station, parking etc. However, even with all of these
subroutines planned, my plan remains incomplete. There are sub-subroutines that
are unformulated, but nevertheless essential, parts of my plan. For example,
executing my plan to drive my car to the station involves turning my car on, pressing
the accelerator, steering the car, etc. I definitely do not explicitly plan to do some or
all of these things when I make my plan to ride the Metrolink tomorrow. These
unplanned aspects of my behavior are the ones most likely to be improvised. This
idea was clearly expressed in my discussion of musical improvisation. A jazz
musician might have a plan to play [such-and-such] song, without planning all the
specific subroutines that are required in order to execute such a plan, i.e. plans to
play [such-and-such] notes. The unplanned subroutines of an action plan are usually
the actions that end up counting as improvised.
The unplanned subroutines of my plan to ride the Metrolink do not
necessarily count as improvised though. This is because my account requires
improvised actions to be novel. Much like bringing my bow up the my instrument, the
steps I take toward the Metrolink platform are a matter of routine. Riding the
Metrolink is something I do almost every day and the steps I take to get there are
almost the same day-in and day-out. The steps I take toward the Metrolink platform
therefore are not novel actions. However, if I get to the Metrolink station and find a
crime scene with police tape blocking the path I usually take toward the platform, I
may be forced to take a new route towards where I want to be. These steps may
then count as improvised. S what makes an action novel then?
Some readers may be worried that what counts as novel may be dependent
on the audience5. For example, for some audiences, a stand-up comedians material

5

Thanks to Brit Brogaard for this suggestion.
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might be novel, in that they have never heard it before. On the other hand, the
comedian’s tour manager has heard his routine a thousand times. The comedian’s
material is definitely not novel for his tour manager. I want to try to eliminate this
worry by defining novel in terms of the (mega)type/token distinction discussed by
Alperson and others. We can say that a novel action is an action that is not an
instantiation of an already existing megatype. So if a comedian is telling the same
jokes night after night, his performances are not novel, because his routine
instantiates an already existing megatype. If a comedian is working on new material
based on suggestions from the audience or working with a group to create a totally
new scene, like the players at Second City in Chicago do night after night, then these
actions are novel.
Again we saw this played out in the discussion of musical improvisation.
Songs, like the various versions of “Johnny B, Goode”, which are repeated note for
note night after night, are not improvised because they instantiate an already existing
megatype. On the other hand, a concert performed by the award winning jazz
pianist, Keith Jarrett is likely to be something that has never been heard before. Such
a concert is novel, and if it is unplanned, should count as improvised. Consider how
the novel and unplanned requirements of my definition work together. The very first
full performance of a piece of classical music might be considered a novel action, in
that it the specific melodies and harmonies that make up the piece had never been
performed before. However, such a performance is not improvised, except in the way
Gould and Keaton point out, because the players planned to play those notes in
advance. So novel but planned actions are not improvised in the same way that
unplanned but routine actions are not improvised.
Here’s another worry: some actions, that are not necessarily novel, might
indeed still be considered improvised. For example, a basketball team might practice
a particular play during practice, and then five seasons later spontaneously use that
play during a game6. Two possible responses to this worry present themselves. First,
I might just hold my ground and say such a situation should not count as an
improvised action, even though it was unplanned, because it was used in practice
before and therefore is not novel. The other option, and the stronger response in my

6

thanks to John Brunero for this counter example.
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opinion, is to say that the two actions are actually different in important respects. For
example, presumably the play was originally run in a carefully controlled practice
environment. It was run based on orders from a coach trying to make his team
better. The second instance of the play was run during the course of a game, in
response to a unique situation not present during the practice five years ago. So
while the product of the action might appear to be the same, the action undertaken is
actually quite different and, in terms of my definition, novel. Readers might note the
similarity of this response to Alperson’s response that a recording of an improvised
performance might be replicated. The response turns on distinguishing between the
two senses of ‘improvisation’, the action sense and the product sense. In the case of
the replayed basketball play, the product may indeed be a reproduction, but the
action is novel, and thus can still count as improvised.
A final worry is that there might be actions that are both unplanned and novel
that nevertheless should not be considered improvised. Here I have in mind certain
random actions, like speaking in tongues, muscle spasms, slips of the tongue, and
maybe certain musical performances like John Cages ‘4’33”’ (pronounced “four
minutes, thirty-three seconds”). To account for this worry my definition of improvised
action requires that improvised actions be performed within a well-defined
improvisational framework. What I have in mind here is something like a limited
range of possible options for behavior7. If there are too many options available to an
agent, then the action might not be improvised. If there are too few options available
to an agent, then too the action might not be improvised
Take for example a case where the framework is too broad. John Cage’s
‘4’33”’ is a good example of this kind of case. The piece is a conceptual work made
up of three-movements of complete silence from the performer(s). The total time it
takes to play the three movements adds up to four minutes and thirty-three seconds,
hence the title. The music of the piece is supposed to consists of the ambient noise

7

It might be possible to discuss the range of possible options for behavior in terms of the
technical notion of ‘affordances’. I have explored this idea in previous drafts of this paper but
have decided to refrain from using it in the final version. I abandon affordances in part
because it has proven to be too controversial and/or confusing for some readers and giving a
full defense of it would take too much time. Further, relying on the ordinary way we talk about
‘options’ seems like it will suffice for present purposes. With that being said, I have not totally
given up on the idea of using affordances in my account.
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of the room in which the piece is being performed. The music is not a standard case
of improvisation because the ambient noise in most rooms is almost totally
random8—who could predict that some bird would chirp outside right at the beginning
of the performance, or that the man in the sixth seat of the tenth row would cough
lightly into his hand at the 1’45” mark, or that the man sitting eight rows behind him
would shift in his squeaky seat as the piece concluded. The music produced by
these actions is not improvised on my account, because it does not occur within a
well-determined improvisational framework. They way ‘4’33”’ is set up, the piece
could be performed during any 4’33” interval of time, at any place a conductor
chooses. On this reading, the number of possible performances of the piece is near
infinite. So, even if we agree that performances of 4’33” are unplanned and novel in
the relevant ways, the content of the piece is randomly determined, and not rightly
considered improvised. If the framework were to be constrained a bit more, as in
standard cases of jazz performances, then the performance could be considered
improvised.
On the other hand, when a framework affords too few options, or even just
one option, then actions performed within those frameworks are not improvised.
Following a recipe is a good example of this. A recipe might call for 1 cup of sugar, 1
cup of milk, 2 cups of flower, 1 egg, 3 tablespoons of butter, a tablespoon of baking
powder and a pinch of salt. Putting this recipe together is obviously not a description
of an improvised action, because there is not a sufficient degree of freedom available
to the cook. They must use 1 cup of sugar, 2 cups of flower etc. Making an old family
chili recipe might allow for more freedom and be closer to an improvised action. One
can decide during the making of the recipe how much chili powder to use, depending
on how spicy one likes their food. One might feel inspired to add some dark beer, a
splash of bourbon, extra onion or bacon bits, depending on how one feels and what
ingredients one has available. The chili cook is free to improviser, whereas the
pancake cook has to stick to the recipe.
When the framework opens up into a well-determined set of options, then one
has the freedom to improvise within that framework. When the framework becomes
8

In this example I am thinking about improvisation in the product sense, rather than the
action sense, as it is not clear who the performers of the music are. This makes it difficult to
speak coherently about the actions involved in the performance.

Lepore 17

too broad, one is no longer improvising but acting randomly. When the framework
becomes too narrow, one is no longer improvising but following a recipe. It is not
clear where to set the boundaries between improvisation and recipe following and
improvisation and random action. It might be that there are no truly random actions
or totally planned/deliberate actions. It might be that all actions are, in some sense,
improvised actions, and that random actions and planned actions are a kind of
idealized action type. I don’t intend to defend this claim in this paper, but I do think it
is worth pointing out here as a possibility to be further explored in later work.
Conclusion
To conclude I want to point out that a common form of human behavior is the
following-- one establishes some goal, and makes some plans to achieve that goal,
including the planning of some basic subroutines. At a certain point, with some
subroutines and some sub-subroutines left unplanned, one begins acting toward that
goal. The unplanned subroutines of one’s plan end up being improvised along the
way. This is especially true of our behavior in new and unusual situations—think of
MacGyver improvising his way out of a jail cell with nothing but a Swiss Army Knife
and a roll of duct tape. In common every-day situations, like riding the Metrolink, the
unplanned parts of the larger plan sometimes do not qualify as improvised because
they are simply a matter of routine. To the extent that our lives have not become so
routine that we find ourselves retracing our steps day-after-day, repeating the same
old stories and ideas to the same tired people, we seem to improvise our way
through a great deal of our waking life. On this view, improvising may be a symptom
of an interesting life, devoid of boring repetitive routines.
Charles Limb, the neuroscientist studying improvisation mentioned at the
outset, has made some interesting discoveries about what is going on in the brain
when we improvise. By comparing fMRI data collected from musicians improvising
with fMRI data collected from musicians playing over-learned musical sequences,
Limb has begun to uncover the neural correlates of improvised action (2008). I
should point out now, that thanks to my view we can understand improvisation as the
performance of an unplanned, novel action performed within some predetermined
improvisational framework, as opposed to just the spontaneous performance of
certain types of actions, as Limb originally has it. Now when we talk about Limb’s
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findings, we can understand them in terms of my new definition, rather than the
obscure terms his definition of improvisation is originally presented in.
Limb has found that there is significant overlap in the areas of the brain active
during musical improvisation with areas of the brain active during the creation of
autobiographical narrative. Limb and his colleagues suggests this is consistent with
views of improvised music playing as an expression of one’s ‘personal musical voice,
viewpoint or story’ (2008). As if this were not interesting enough, Limb also suggests
that the areas of the brain active during improvisation also overlap with areas of the
brain thought to be involved in the neural instantiation of the self. Limb and his
colleagues show that the areas of the brain active during improvisation overlap with
brain areas associated with internally motivated, self-generated, and stimulusindependent behaviors (2008). This overlap could have potentially interesting effects
on how we understand the self and the source of human agency. Unfortunately I
have not said much about the role of agency in improvisation, though it is sure to
play a big role.
Consider a case where someone performs an unplanned novel action, within
a well-defined improvisational framework, but where the person’s body is controlled
by some angelic presence. Such a case does not seem like a case of improvisation,
even though it fits within the core requirements of my definition. So improvised
actions need to originate from some source of agency belonging to the person who is
said to improvise. Exactly how we should understand agency and its role in
improvisation is a matter outside of the bounds of this paper. The project of
understanding the role of agency in improvisation should be explored in future work
on this subject.
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